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ABSTRACT: Safe Harbour (Henceforth, SH) has been the main enabler of  EU-US personal 
data transfers since Decision 2000/520/EC came into force. Initially, Safe Harbour was seen 
as an innovative solution to a difficult problem. However, the problems the agreement was created 
to solve were never remedied. Thus, it did not come as a surprise that the Court of  Justice of  
the European Union (hereinafter, CJEU), in Case C-362/14 (the Schrems ruling), deemed the 
agreement invalid. In the story “And he built a crooked house”, the infamous ‘crooked house’, 
designed by Robert A. Heinlein’s character Quintus Teal, mirrors SH’s flawed design. It also 
exemplifies the fact that great innovations can fail if  not thought through carefully. Although the 
Schrems ruling’s scope does not go beyond Decision 2000/520/EC, it will force European Data 
Protection Agencies to look deeper into alternative data transfer mechanisms and possibly, consider 
transfers to jurisdictions other than the US. Furthermore, this decision highlights the fact that if  
any progress on this front is going to be made going forward regarding personal data transfers, any 
solution(s) would have to be made at a global level. This paper will provide an overview of  the 
implications of  the CJEU ruling on data transfers between the EU and the US going forward.
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1. Introduction
The CJEU ruling on Case C-362/14 (the Schrems ruling),1 which resulted in 
the invalidation of  Decision 2000/520, means that personal data will no longer be 
able to be transferred from the EU to the US, without regulatory approval from 
Data Protection agencies in each EU Member State. In the Court’s view, there is no 
guarantee that under SH, the principle of  adequate protection is strictly adhered to and that 
the personal data of  European citizens’ is, potentially, not given equal treatment on 
both sides of  the Atlantic.
Fueled by the revelations of  former National Security Agency (Henceforth, 
NSA) employee Edward Snowden and the subsequent worries over how effective 
data protection is in the US, Austrian citizen Maximillian Schrems filed a complaint 
with the Irish Data Protection Authority (hereinafter, DPA), claiming that Facebook 
was transferring the personal data of  its users to a country (i.e. the US) that did not 
meet the standard level of  protection, promulgated in Article 25 (1) of  Directive 
95/46/EC. Given the findings on the surveillance activities carried out by US public 
authorities, the Irish Commissioner considered that there was no evidence that Mr 
Schrems’ personal data had been accessed by the NSA. He added that the allegations 
raised by Mr Schrems in his complaint could not be submitted since any question 
of  the adequacy of  data protection in the US had to be determined in accordance 
with Decision 2000/520. In that decision, the Commission had found that the US 
ensured an adequate level of  protection.2 Subsequently, Mr. Schrems challenged 
the Irish DPA’s decision before the Irish Court who, later, referred the issue to the 
CJEU, under the Preliminary Reference Procedure.3 The ruling puts all flows of  
data between the EU and the US at stake, and has forced both blocks’ to find a new, 
alternative framework for data transfers.
As this paper delves into the intricacies of  this ruling, the authors will try to 
explain how changes to US data protection law is, arguably the only way to guarantee 
that both, a new SH and other data transfer mechanisms, remain viable, safe and law 
abiding avenues to conduct such transfers across both sides of  the Atlantic.
This paper will also explore the growing notion that only a global solution to data 
transfers can allay people’s apprehensions about their fundamental right to privacy 
being encroached upon by unscrupulous individuals, companies or governments. 
SH is, indeed, the tip of  the iceberg as data transfers from the EU to other parts 
of  the world will, soon, be in the spotlight. Now that the CJEU has evaluated the 
shortcomings of  the US legal framework, it is only a matter of  time before the issue 
of  adequate protection is raised again regarding transfers to other jurisdictions.
2. The Tesseract House and the Tesseract Harbour
Quintus Teal is a name that might not have said much in the European 
Commission (henceforth, EC) and the US Department of  Commerce (henceforth, 
DOC) in the late nineties and the beginning of  the first decade of  the 21st century. 
However, the ideology behind his work surely must have been at the heart of  the 
Commission’s Decision 2000/520/EC and the SH principles and the Frequently 
Asked Questions (hereinafter, FOA) put forward by their American counterpart in 
1 Judgment Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, October 2015. 
2 Para. 29 of  the Ruling. 
3 Article 267 TFEU. 
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the year 2000.4
Quintus, the lead character from the story “And he built a crooked house” by Robert 
A. Heinlein,5 claims for himself  the endeavour of  designing and building the true house 
of  the future, the present and the past. Putting a name for himself  as an architectural, 
“visionary” if  you like or as Robert A. Heinlein describes him, “the original Hermit of  
Hollywood,”6 he starts by asking his friend Homer Bailey: “What is a house?”7
In a passionate discussion, arising from the said question, Quintus asks crudely: 
“What’s Frank Lloyd Wright got that I haven’t got?,”8 only to be dismissed by Homer 
Bailey’s even cruder answer: “Commissions.”9 It is perfectly clear that Bailey´s answer 
had nothing to do with the EC or with the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter 
FTC),10 looking deeper into the “crooked house” designed and built by the two 
institutions, admittedly embedded in the same good will as Quintus’ quintessential, 
albeit, defective masterpiece, we can’t help but notice the similarities displayed in 
both, the concept and in the results it has produced.
Although Quintus hits back at Homer with a rhetorically valid point when he 
says “why should we be held down by frozen concepts of  our ancestors,”11 as he grasps to make 
his friend fully understand his own concept of  a breathing, living house, responding 
to the surrounding environment and its inhabitants – we unfortunately know that 
the end result does fail to demonstrate his point. The ingenious “tesseract house” 
became both his life’s work and his bypass to perpetual unemployment.
The four dimensional house of  Quintus proved too vague and uncertain for the 
daily life. As with its spectacular capolavoro fallout, where the owners of  the house and 
the architect himself  ended up stranded inside a labyrinth in which entering any door 
was a life threatening experience, as they did not know where it would lead them 
next, the SH agreement was invalidated by the CJEU because of  the uncertainty over 
whether the fundamental right of  the European constituents, to privacy of  data,12 
was being adequately safeguarded.
A SH 2.0 has been suggested13 by the Commission as a response to the Court’s 
arguments, but doubts remain over how effective a self-regulatory based mechanism 
will be in restoring confidence in transatlantic personal data transfer when the 
fundamental rights issue at stake doesn’t seem to be at the epicentre of  the solution.
4 The Decision is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32000D0520 and https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2000/07/24/00-18489/
issuance-of-safe-harbor-principles-and-transmission-to-european-commission contains the Principles 
and Frequently Asked Questions issued by the Department of  Commerce.
5 Robert A. Heinlein, “And he built a crooked house”, 2013, Ibook edition, published together with 
other four short stories in the ebook “All you zombies” - Five Classic Stories by Robert A. Heinlein.
6 Idem, 9-61. 
7 Idem, 9-61. 
8 Idem, 9-61. 
9 Idem, 9-61. 
10 The Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) is responsible for the oversight of  the SH 
scheme in the US. See http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/45, section 5 of  the FTC Act. 
11 Robert Heinlein, op. cit. 9-61. 
12 Article 8 of  the Charter.
13 See Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Transfer 
of  Personal Data from the EU to the United States of  America under Directive 95/46/EC 
following the Judgment Schrems by the Court of  Justice in, Case C-362/14, – COM (2015) 566 final, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/files/eu-
us_data_flows_communication_final.pdf. 
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3. The Schrems ruling
In the case referred to the CJEU from Northern Ireland, Maximillian Schrems 
challenged the Irish Data Protection Commissioner’s decision not to pursue the 
latter’s claims against Facebook Ireland Ltd. Schrems argued that by transferring 
the personal data of  its (i.e Facebook’s) users to the US, and keeping it on servers 
there in light of  the recent findings on the mass surveillance done by the NSA, inter 
alia, Facebook was responsible for data transfers to a country that “…did not ensure 
adequate protection…”14 of  personal data.
The Irish Data Commissioner, for its part, decided that “…his complaint could not 
be profitably put forward since any question of  the adequacy of  data protection in the United States 
had to be determined in accordance with Decision 2000/520 and the Commission had found in 
that decision that the United States ensured an adequate level of  protection.”15
Following the Commissioner’s decision, Schrems presented the case to Ireland’s 
High Court, which acknowledged some of  the threats raised by Schrems, namely the 
fact that “Union citizens have no effective right to be heard. Oversight of  the intelligence services’ 
actions is carried out within the framework of  an ex parte and secret procedure. Once the personal 
data has been transferred to the United States, it is capable of  being accessed by the NSA and other 
federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), in the course of… indiscriminate 
surveillance…”16 The Court, however, considered that the implementation of  EU law, 
as referred to in Article 51 of  the Charter, was in question, as Decision 2000/520’s 
validity had to be assessed. This prompted the Irish High Court to refer the case to 
the CJEU, together with two questions, for a preliminary ruling. The questions are 
enunciated below:17
(1) Whether in the course of  determining a complaint which has been made to an 
independent office holder, who has been vested by statute with the functions of  
administering and enforcing data protection legislation, that personal data is being 
transferred to another third country, (in this case, the US) the laws and practices of  
which, it is claimed, do not contain adequate protections for the data subject, that office 
holder is absolutely bound by the Community finding to the contrary contained in 
[Decision 2000/520] having regard to Article 7, Article 8 and Article 47 of  [the 
Charter], the provisions of  Article 25(6) of  Directive [95/46] notwithstanding?
(2) Or, alternatively, may and/or must the office holder conduct his or her own 
investigation of  the matter in the light of  factual developments in the meantime since 
that Commission decision was first published?
In its ruling the Court began by pointing out what the Commission had already 
voiced18 through its Communications – COM(2013) 846 final19 and COM(2013) 847 
14 Alexandra Maria Rodrigues Araújo, “The Right to Data Protection and the Commissions’ 
Adequacy Decision”, in UNIO – EU Law Journal. Vol. 1, No. 1, July 2015, p. 77-93, for an extensive 
overview on the Commission’s Adequacy Decision. 
15 Id., para. 29. 
16 Ibid., para. 31. 
17 Ibid., para. 36. 
18 Ibid., para. 11 to 25.
19 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_846_en.pdf.
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final,20 both of  which derived from the Snowden revelations.
The Irish Court addressed some of  the findings the Commission’s report and 
acknowledged the fact that SH was a voluntary and sparsely regulated agreement 
that, potentially, left the data of  EU citizens vulnerable to unauthorized access by US 
officials, thereby undermining the basis upon which the data was originally collected 
and the purposes for which it was transferred. Secondly, the Commission observed 
that SH also acts as a conduit for the transfer of  the personal data of  EU citizens 
from the EU to the US by companies required to surrender data to US intelligence 
agencies under the US intelligence collection programmes.
Notwithstanding, the Commission concluded in point 3.2 that, given the 
weaknesses found, the current implementation of  SH could not be maintained, but at the same 
time, acknowledged that its revocation would adversely affect the interests of  Member 
Companies in the EU and the US. Finally, the Commission added that it would 
engage the US authorities to discuss the shortcomings identified.
Taking into consideration Communication COM(2013) 847 final, the Court 
highlighted the fact that the Commission had already stressed that “[a]ny gap in 
transparency or in enforcement on the US’ side results in responsibility being shifted to European 
data protection authorities and to the companies which use the schemem,” adding that “It is 
apparent, in particular, from points 3 to 5 and 8 of  Communication COM(2013) 847 final that, 
in practice, a significant number of  certified companies did not comply, or did not comply fully, with 
the safe harbour principles.”
Point 7 of  Communication COM(2013) 847 final states that “all companies 
involved in the PRISM programme,21 and which grant access to US authorities to data stored 
and processed in the [United States], appear to be Safe Harbour certified’ and that ”[t]his has 
made the Safe Harbour scheme one of  the conduits through which access is given to US intelligence 
authorities to collect personal data initially processed in the [European Union].” In that regard, 
the Commission noted in point 7.1 of  that communication that “a number of  legal bases 
under US law allow large-scale collection and processing of  personal data that is stored or otherwise 
processed [by] companies based in the [United States]” and that “[t]he large-scale nature of  these 
programmes may result in data transferred under Safe Harbour being accessed and further processed 
by US authorities beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of  national 
security as foreseen under the exception provided in [Decision 2000/520].”
Another troublesome aspect of  the findings was the double standard that EU 
citizens face against US citizens given that “safeguards that are provided under US law 
are mostly reserved for US citizens or legal residents”22 and that, “[m]oreover, there 
are no opportunities for either EU or US data subjects to obtain access, rectification 
or erasure of  data, or administrative or judicial redress with regard to collection and 
further processing of  their personal data taking place under the US surveillance 
programmes.”23
Finally, the Court underlined point 8 of  Communication COM(2013) 847 final, 
where the Commission states that: “the large-scale access by intelligence agencies to data 
transferred to the [United States] by Safe Harbour certified companies raises additional serious 
20 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf. 
21 For a comprehensive explanation about the PRISM Programme, see Lee, Timothy B., 2013, “Here’s 
everything we know about PRISM to date”, Washington Post, June 12. Available at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/.
22 COM(2013) 847 final, Point 7.2, 17. 
23 Idem. 
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questions regarding the continuity of  data protection rights of  Europeans when their data is 
transferred to the [United States].”
It is clear that the main questions posed by the Irish High Court didn’t pertain to 
SH’s validity in itself. In fact, the main issue at stake in the Schrems ruling was whether 
after the Commission’s Decision 2000/520, a supervisory authority was or wasn’t 
able to act on a person’s complaint regarding the concrete existence of  an adequate 
level of  protection in a given case, when the country to where the data is transferred 
has previously been considered by the EC, to have an adequate level of  protection, 
pursuant to Article 25(6) of  Directive 95/46. This is the standard by which the 
Commission finds that a third country ensures an adequate level of  protection of  personal 
data. The Court highlights that Directive 95/46 “must necessarily be interpreted in the light 
of  the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter,”24 and cites its own jurisprudence to 
not only to emphasize the need to approach this matter as a question of  fundamental 
rights, but also to clarify that the national supervisory authorities act according to 
strict independence requirements, as derived from the directive but also, from article 
8 of  the Charter and article 16 (2) of  the Treaty.25 
It goes on to note that the independence criteria is of  utmost importance, as 
this is needed to ensure the national supervisory authorities effectively and reliably, 
monitor compliance with the provisions concerning protection of  individuals’ 
fundamental rights, which must be interpreted in light of  that aim.  The establishment 
in Member States of  independent supervisory authorities is therefore, as stated 
in recital 62 in the preamble to Directive 95/46; an essential component of  the 
protection of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data.
In order to guarantee that protection, the national supervisory authorities must, 
in particular, ensure a fair balance between, on the one hand, observance of  the 
fundamental right to privacy and, on the other, the interests requiring free movement 
of  personal data.
The national supervisory authorities have a wide range of  powers for that 
purpose. Those powers, listed on a non-exhaustive list in Article 28(3) of  Directive 
95/46, are needed for them to perform their duties effectively, as stated in Recital 
63 in the Preamble to the directive. These authorities, in effect, possess investigative 
powers, such as the power to collect all the information necessary for the performance 
of  their supervisory duties, effective powers of  intervention, such as imposing a 
temporary or definitive ban on processing of  data, and the power to engage in legal 
proceedings.
It is, immediately apparent from Article 28(1) and (6) of  Directive 95/46 that 
the powers of  the national supervisory authorities concern processing of  personal 
data carried out on the territory of  their own Member State. Hence, they do not have 
competence on the basis of  Article 28, to influence how personal data is processed 
in an external jurisdiction.
However, the process of  data transfers from a Member State to a third country 
still constitutes, in itself, processing of  personal data within the meaning of  Article 
24 Para. 38 of  the Ruling. 
25 “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of  individuals with regard to the 
processing of  personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member 
States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of  Union law, and the rules relating 
to the free movement of  such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of  
independent authorities.” 
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2(b) of  Directive 95/46. That provision defines ‘processing of  personal data’ as; “any 
operation or set of  operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means” and mentions, by way of  example, “disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available.”
Article 2(b) of  Directive 95/46. That provision defines ‘processing of  personal 
data’ as; “any operation or set of  operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means” and mentions, by way of  example, “disclosure 
by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available.”
Recital 60 in the Preamble to Directive 95/46 states that transfers of  personal 
data to third countries may be effected only in full compliance with the provisions 
adopted by the Member States pursuant to the Directive. In that regard, Chapter IV 
of  the Directive, in which Articles 25 and 26 appear, has set up a regime intended to 
ensure that the Member States oversee transfers of  personal data to third countries. 
That regime is complementary to the general regime set up by Chapter II of  the 
directive laying down the general rules on the lawfulness of  the processing of  
personal data.
As, in accordance with Article 8(3) of  the Charter and Article 28 of  Directive 
95/46, the national supervisory authorities are responsible for monitoring compliance 
with the EU rules, such as, inter alia, the protection of  individuals’ fundamental rights 
in the processing of  their personal data. Hence, each of  them is vested with the 
power to check whether a transfer of  personal data from its own Member State to a 
third country complies with the requirements laid down by Directive 95/46.26
The way the Court emphasizes the powers and independence of  national 
supervisory authorities serves to reinforce the point that those entities must 
exercise the powers vested onto them and that, by Decision 2000/520 limiting that 
independence, that decision is invalid. It also suggests that to assure an adequate 
level of  protection for EU citizens, any given third country must enforce a similar 
supervisory mechanism. Although the Court never explicitly mentions such a 
condition, it is, arguably, impossible to admit future transfers of  data to third countries, 
where the overseeing authorities are not guaranteed this level of  independence, as 
the question of  fundamental right(s) at risk is never fully answered if  that criterion 
is not met. We will get back to this when we analyse the current legal framework in 
the US.
It becomes clear that “Neither Article 8(3) of  the Charter nor Article 28 of  Directive 
95/46 excludes from the national supervisory authorities’ sphere of  competence the oversight of  
transfers of  personal data to third countries which have been the subject of  a Commission decision 
pursuant to Article 25(6) of  Directive 95/46.” In fact, admitting that a supervisory 
authority is bound not to act on any claim lodged by a natural person on these 
matters is contradictory to the system put forward by the EU legislator, as the court 
so eloquently affirms, following its interpretation of  Articles 25 and 28 of  the 
Directive: “…If  that were not so, persons whose personal data has been or could be transferred 
to the third country concerned would be denied the right, guaranteed by Article 8(1) and (3) of  the 
Charter, to lodge with the national supervisory authorities a claim for the purpose of  protecting their 
fundamental rights.” The CJEU goes further to notice that the EU is a union based on 
the rule of  law. The Commission’s decisions cannot, therefore, escape independent 
review.”27
26 Para. 41 to 47 of  the Ruling. 
27 Paragraphs 56 to 60 of  the Ruling. 
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The Court goes on to state that despite a person’s right to lodge complaints 
with their respective supervisory authorities on the lawfulness of  data transfers to 
third countries and the latter’s duty to examine it, if  the said claims is considered 
unfounded, there must be a legal mechanism put in force to enable the claimant to 
dispute the findings of  those authorities in a court of  justice, so that subsequently it 
can refer the question, if  the judge(s) so chooses, to the CJEU. Nevertheless, when a 
national supervisory authority comes to the conclusion that the claimant’s arguments 
are solid enough to argue the invalidity of  the legal instrument that enables the data 
transfer, it must; “in accordance with the third indent of  the first subparagraph of  Article 28(3) 
of  Directive 95/46...be able to engage in legal proceedings.“28
These procedures all derive from the fact that, although a national authority is 
competent to receive and examine a complaint of  a person that may challenge the 
validity of  an EU legal instrument, only the CJEU is able; “…to declare that an EU act, 
such as a Commission decision adopted pursuant to Article 25(6) of  Directive 95/46, is invalid”29 
, the exclusivity of  that jurisdiction having the purpose of  guaranteeing legal certainty by ensuring 
that EU law is applied uniformly….”30 
After finding that any national EU supervisory authority should act on a 
complaint of  a natural person concerned with the existence of  a level of  adequate 
protection in a third country to which their personal data is being transferred to, the 
court takes on the much more perilous task of  assessing the grounds on which Safe 
Harbour has been built upon.
Referring to Article 25 (6) of  the directive, the Court is unequivocal about 
how the level of  adequate protection must be ascertained. Admitting that there is 
no definition of  adequate protection laid down by the directive, it notes that; “…
provision requires that a third country ‘ensures’ an adequate level of  protection by reason of  
its domestic law or its international commitments. Secondly, according to the same provision, the 
adequacy of  the protection ensured by the third country is assessed ‘for the protection of  the private 
lives and basic freedoms and rights of  individuals.”
Thus, Article 25(6) of  Directive 95/46 implements the express obligation laid 
down in Article 8(1) of  the Charter to protect personal data and, as the Advocate 
General has observed in point 139 of  his Opinion, is intended to ensure that the 
high level of  that protection continues where personal data is transferred to a third 
country.”31
To some extent, the Court lays down what is to be considered an adequate level 
of  protection. It held that such a concept “must be understood as requiring the third country 
in fact to ensure, by reason of  its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of  protection 
of  fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the 
European Union by virtue of  Directive 95/46 read in the light of  the Charter.” This is not 
a definition, in itself, of  the concrete terms on which such a legal concept can be 
fulfilled but, it does stress a theoretical construction that allows for further certitude. 
We earlier mentioned the plausible need for a third country, willing to receive data 
from the EU, to implement an independent supervisory authority or an equivalent 
public body with similar responsibilities and powers to oversee compliance requisites 
by companies and the public sector alike and, enforce whatever measures are deemed 
28 Paragraphs 63 to 65 of  the Ruling. 
29 Articles 264 and 267 of  TFEU regulate the effects of  the declaration of  invalidity. 
30 Para. 61 of  the Ruling. 
31 Paragraphs 71 and 72 of  the Ruling. 
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necessary to uphold the fundamental rights at stake.
The said legal order is, as the Court admits, a changing reality that must be 
continuously monitored by the Commission so that its adequacy level stays updated 
(“factually and legally”).32 Moreover, “the Commission’s discretion as to the adequacy 
of  the level of  protection ensured by a third country is reduced, with the result that 
review of  the requirements stemming from Article 25 of  Directive 95/46, read in 
the light of  the Charter, should be strict.”
Regarding the SH scheme, the Court denotes various shortcomings. From the 
outset, the Court finds that a self-certification system, as is the case of  SH, does not 
necessarily fall over the scope of  Article 25 (6) of  the directive but it still requires 
further assurances: “the reliability of  such a system, in the light of  that requirement, is founded 
essentially on the establishment of  effective detection and supervision mechanisms enabling any 
infringements of  the rules ensuring the protection of  fundamental rights, in particular the right to 
respect for private life and the right to protection of  personal data, to be identified and punished 
in practice.”33 On the other hand, the CJEU critically highlights the fact that only 
companies of  the private sector are eligible for (and abide by) the SH scheme and not 
the public sector.34 More troublesome is the fact that the SH scheme doesn’t provide 
for adequate measures that make it possible for the US to uphold the adequate level 
of  protection envisioned by Directive 95/46.35
Equally disturbing to the Court’s understanding is paragraph 4 of  Annex I to 
the Decision 2000/520 by which the principles of  SH are dismissed under certain 
conditions, “the applicability of  the safe harbour principles may be limited, in particular, ‘to 
the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements’ 
and ‘by statute, government regulation, or case-law that create conflicting obligations or explicit 
authorisations, provided that, in exercising any such authorisation, an organisation can demonstrate 
that its non-compliance with the Principles is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding 
legitimate interests furthered by such authorisation’.”36
This is, unequivocally, the problematic issue that dilutes the potency of  Court’s 
ruling. The bypass to the SH principles means not only that its effectiveness is called 
into question, but the mere likelihood of  an adequate level of  protection being 
respected is bleak, to say the least. Giving the US authorities and the SH adherents 
the ability to circumvent their obligations under such nebulous conditions has the 
potential to undermine any initiatives that could be introduced to ensure fundamental 
rights are better protected during the process of  inter-jurisdictional data transfers.
Besides, in Decision 2000/520 there is no evidence whatsoever of  “the existence 
of  effective legal protection against interference of  that kind.” The different approach of  both 
sides of  the Atlantic is well documented by the fact that SH only acknowledges the 
need for dispute resolutions under this scheme for commercial purposes and cannot 
be summoned to resolve the main issue at stake, i.e., the “legality of  interference with 
fundamental rights that results from measures originating from the State.”37
The Court quotes the Commission’s Communication COM(2013) 846 final, notably 
stressing the fact that “…the Commission found that the United States authorities were able 
32 Para. 76 of  the Ruling. 
33 Para. 81 of  the Ruling. 
34 Para. 82 of  the Ruling. 
35 Para. 83 of  the Ruling. 
36 Para. 84 of  the Ruling. 
37 Para. 89 of  the Ruling. 
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to access the personal data transferred from the Member States to the United States and process 
it in a way incompatible, in particular, with the purposes for which it was transferred, beyond 
what was strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of  national security….” Also, the 
Commission noted that the data subjects had no administrative or judicial means of  
redress enabling, in particular, the data relating to them to be accessed and, as the 
case may be, rectified or erased.38 There were no “…clear and precise rules governing the 
scope and application of  a measure and imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose 
personal data is concerned have sufficient guarantees enabling their data to be effectively protected 
against the risk of  abuse and against any unlawful access and use of  that data.”39
Both the purpose limitation and the necessity principles were at stake, posing 
constant and unforeseen threats to the Charter’s (Article 8) and the directive’s 
(Chapter 2) basic grounds over which data processing is legally admitted.
A further point was made against the fact that “…any differentiation, limitation or 
exception [was] being made in the light of  the objective pursued and without an objective criterion 
being laid down by which to determine the limits of  the access of  the public authorities to the data, 
and of  its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of  justifying 
the interference which both access to that data and its use entail”40 “in complete contradiction not 
only with the directive but also with the case law of  the Court.”41 Such a generalised violation 
of  a person’s right to respect for private life together with the lack of  remedies 
provided to the ones affected by such violation could not be tolerated by the Court.
Given the Commission’s non-compliance with the need to factually present the 
case with specific, “identified and identifiable” legal arguments for the backing of  
any adequate level of  protection ruling, the Court found “…that Article 1 of  Decision 
2000/520 fails to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 25(6) of  Directive 95/46, 
read in the light of  the Charter, and that it is, therefore invalid.”42 
In what concerns Article 343 of  Decision 2000/520, the Court was much more 
38 Para. 90 of  the Ruling. 
39 Para. 91 of  the Ruling. 
40 Para. 93 of  the Ruling. 
41 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238, by which the 
Directive 2006/24/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 March 2006 on the 
retention of  data generated or processed in connection with the provision of  publicly available 
electronic communications services or of  public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC were declared invalid. 
42 Par. 98 of  the Ruling. 
43 Article 3 (1) read as follows:
Without prejudice to their powers to take action to ensure compliance with national provisions 
adopted pursuant to provisions other than Article 25 of  Directive 95/46/EC, the competent 
authorities in Member States may exercise their existing powers to suspend data flows to an 
organisation that has self-certified its adherence to the Principles implemented in accordance with 
the FAQs in order to protect individuals with regard to the processing of  their personal data in 
cases where:
(a) the government body in the United States referred to in Annex VII to this Decision or an 
independent recourse mechanism within the meaning of  letter (a) of  the Enforcement Principle 
set out in Annex I to this Decision has determined that the organisation is violating the Principles 
implemented in accordance with the FAQs; or
(b) there is a substantial likelihood that the Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for 
believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not take adequate and timely 
steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of  grave harm to 
data subjects; and the competent authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under 
the circumstances to provide the organisation with notice and an opportunity to respond.
The suspension shall cease as soon as compliance with the Principles implemented in accordance 
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succinct, stating that the conditions posed onto supervisory authorities were to “…
be understood as denying the national supervisory authorities the powers which they derive from 
Article 28 of  Directive 95/46, where a person, in bringing a claim under that provision, puts 
forward matters that may call into question whether a Commission decision that has found, on the 
basis of  Article 25(6) of  the Directive, that a third country ensures an adequate level of  protection 
is compatible with the protection of  the privacy and of  the fundamental rights and freedoms of  
individuals.”44 
As with Article 1, Article 3 was also ruled invalid together with all the remaining 
articles of  Decision 2000/520.
4. A new “Crooked Harbour”?
Since the beginning, SH has been the practical response to a theoretical 
problem. As the economic importance of  data, and personal data in particular, 
rose at the verge of  the 21st century, the legal frameworks that tried to respond 
to the challenges posed by the increasing new industry of  data gathering and data 
processing had to play catch-up in a very dynamic atmosphere. In this regard, it is 
well known that both EU and the US have been at the forefront of  this integral part 
of  the new technological revolution.45
As the writers said in the beginning of  this paper, the SH scheme appeared to 
be a good willed product designed to render the impossible possible, a legal tool that 
would allow two different legal frameworks to operate harmoniously. The fact of  the 
matter is that even at early stages of  the implementation of  SH, numerous doubts 
emerged over its applicability and conformity with EU law.
The Article 29 Working Party (henceforth, WP) was one of  the most notorious 
agents to voice out those doubts. On its Opinion 4/2000,46 concerning the level 
of  protection provided by the “SH Principles”, the WP took note of  some of  the 
shortcomings that the Court underlined: 
• “Since adherence to SH is based on self-certification, without any kind of  ex-ante 
verification, the supervisory powers of  a public body are essential for the credibility of  
the arrangement.”47  
• The WP reiterates its view that adherence to the principles should only 
with the FAQs is assured and the competent authorities concerned in the Community are notified 
thereof.
44 Para. 102 of  the Ruling. 
45 This new industrial revolution is one of  a sheer magnitude as Victoria Espinel, President and 
CEO of  the Business Software Alliance, demonstrated on her opening statements during the joint 
hearing of  the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade with the Subcommittee on 
Communications and Technology, Committee on Energy and Commerce, gathered to “Examin[e] the 
Eu Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows.” Ms. Espinel started by pointing 
out that “While the 19th century was powered by steam and coal and the 20th century by electricity, 
cars, and computers, the 21st century runs on data.”, she then referred to the actual numbers that 
sustained her claims stressing that “More than 90 percent of  the data that exists in the world today was 
created in the last 2 years alone, and that is a rate of  change that will continue to increase exponentially. 
The volume of  business data worldwide is doubling every 15 months…” The preliminary transcript 
of  the hearing is available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20151103/104148/HHRG-
114-IF16-Transcript-20151103.pdf. 
46 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2000/wp32_en.pdf. 
47 Page 3 of  the Opinion. 
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be limited to the extent necessary to comply with conflicting obligations 
and that, for reasons of  transparency and legal certainty, the Commission 
should be notified by the DOC of  any statute or government regulations 
that would affect adherence to the principles. Explicit authorisations, such 
as a reason for exceptions could be accepted only in so far as the overriding 
legitimate interests underlying such authorisations do not substantially 
differ from exemptions or derogations applied in comparable contexts 
by EU Member States in accordance with their laws implementing the 
Directive.48 
• The “bridge” between the two layers is very uncertain. According to FAQ 
11, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (henceforth ADR) bodies should 
notify the FTC of  cases of  failure to comply with the principles, but there 
is, currently, no obligation for them to do so. Although the individuals 
concerned can complain directly to the FTC, there is no guarantee that the 
FTC will examine their case (its powers are discretionary). Additionally, 
individuals would not have the right to be heard before the FTC, to enforce 
the ADR bodies’ decisions before it, nor to challenge such decisions (or 
the lack of  decisions). As a result, the individuals concerned by an alleged 
violation of  the principles would not be assured of  the right to stand 
before an independent decision making body.49 
The awareness of  these and other issues that hindered SH from the outset have 
been at the centre of  current negotiations between the EU and the US. The Schrems 
case was, no doubt, a very tough blow to the current talks and certainly had a big 
impact on, not only the subjects addressed, but also the timing of  the negotiations.
As the Court clearly stated on paragraph 81 of  the ruling, there is nothing 
standing in the way of  a (renewed) system of  self-certification as a legal mean to 
transfer data between the EU and the US, but there are currently so many loopholes 
to be filled that a critical analysis of  such a solution cannot bypass the severe 
difficulties that come into play.
Initiatives such as the “Privacy Bridges - EU and US privacy experts in search of  
transatlantic privacy solutions”50 presented on the last international data protection 
conference51, are obviously welcomed. The ten “bridges” put forward have their own 
merits and it cannot be overly stressed that both sides of  the Atlantic must come 
together and work on subjects such as clearer user control or applying best practices 
for de-identification of  personal data or for security breach notifications.
But the fact of  the matter is that we tend to agree with Marc Rotenberg’s52 view, 
expressed when addressing the US House of  Representatives last October; “The Safe 
Harbour Framework is an industry-developed self-regulatory approach to privacy protection that 
simply does not work. Coordinated by the Department of  Commerce, the Safe Harbour program 
allows US companies to self-certify privacy policies in lieu of  complying with legal requirements for 
48 Page 5 of  the Opinion. 
49 Page 7 of  the Opinion.
50 Available at https://www.privacyconference2015.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Privacy-
Bridges-Paper-release-version.pdf. 
51 The annual International Data Protection Conference took place in Amsterdam, from the 23rd to 
the 29th of  October 2015, gathering data protection authorities together with data processors, data 
controllers and NGO’s. 
52 President of  the Electronic Privacy Information Center “EPIC”. 
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the processing of  data of  Europeans.”53
The ocean that still separates the EU and US spawns out of  different conceptual 
approaches and not out of  a lack of  goodwill. The commercial bias and the consumer 
trust concern entailed into the US privacy policies builds a theoretical and practical 
trench that clearly divides the two continents. This is not to say that the US doesn’t 
look at privacy as a fundamental right, for as Peter Swire54 demonstrated in his most 
recent white paper, the US respect for the right to privacy has been a genuine topic 
of  the US legislators: “Following the resignation of  President Nixon in 1974, Congress passed 
the Privacy Act of  1974, creating new protection against misuse of  personal information by federal 
agencies. In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a path-
breaking legal structure to address the problem of  secret surveillance in an open society.”55
However, the balanced and meaningful changes that have occurred especially 
since the Snowden revelations56 don’t hide the significant differences that persist. 
Swire himself  clarifies that his white paper doesn’t concentrate on specifics of  the 
different legal frameworks as he focuses on the “adequate level of  protection” criteria: 
“One aspect of  this essential equivalence determination for Safe Harbour 2.0 will concern specific 
provisions of  law, such as data subject access rights or the right to have an investigation by an 
independent data protection authority in the data subject’s country. I leave that sort of  essential 
equivalence analysis to other authors.”57
What effectively resonates from up-close viewing is the divergent path that 
both allies have trailed during the last three decades. Kenneth A. Bamberger and 
Deirdre K. Mulligan clinically highlighted this in their recent book “Privacy on the 
ground”58 where the authors frame the US model on handling privacy policies as an 
issue of  “social license” rather than legality.59
The authors demonstrate, through various interviews carried out with major 
privacy players on both sides of  the Atlantic, that there are virtues and dangers to 
both approaches. Even if  they may not conclude it in such a blunt way, the virtues of  
the US model come down to a much more integrated take on privacy by companies, 
something that has made them more aware of  the incremental importance that this 
matter must receive in any big organization. US businesses have instituted stricter 
internal privacy policies than in some of  their European counterparts.60 Adversely, 
where legal compliance becomes the “alpha and omega” of  privacy commitments 
within a company, few steps are given towards integrating privacy as an essential 
and integral part of  management, leaving its intricacies almost exclusively up to 
53 Written testimony presented to the joint hearing of  the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Manufacturing, and Trade with the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, gathered to “Examin[e] the Eu Safe Harbor Decision 
and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows”, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF16/20151103/104148/HHRG-114-IF16-Wstate-RotenbergM-20151103.pdf. 
54 Peter Swire is the Huang Professor of  Law and Ethics at the Georgia Tech Scheller College of  
Business. 
55 Peter Swire, “US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013”, 2015, available at 
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Schrems-White-Paper-12-18-2015.pdf.
56 Detailed in full by Peter Swire in Chapter 3 of  the aforementioned White Paper. 
57 Page 9 ob. cit. 
58 Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground, 2015, MIT Press, Ebook 
edition.
59 Id., page 17. 
60 Germany follows the US closely on this matter, a fact surely related to its history of  tortuous 
national secret intelligent agencies. 
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compliance divisions and legal counsellors.
A point can be raised about how the Europeans are getting closer to this 
perspective. With the new General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter, GDPR)61 
it becomes mandatory to appoint Data Protection Officers (DPO’s) in certain cases.62 
Although already in practice in some EU countries,63 the potential dissemination of  
DPOs is a welcome step towards raising awareness of  data protection issues within 
the organizations.
Although as important as DPO’s may be, a unanimous agreement remains on 
the importance of  independent data protection authorities64 and their supervisory 
role. Deemed an essential aspect of  the EU’s data protection legal framework, the 
existence of  independent DPOs remains one of  the fundamental disagreements 
with the US. As it stands, the principle of  adequate protection, as interpreted by 
the CJEU, cannot be met; the lack of  an independent overview is a critical fault of  
the American data protection legislation and will not be mended easily given the 
reluctance of  public officials to create such a body.
Nevertheless, in the paper’s view, leaving the privacy framework almost 
entirely up to the companies’ management to decide, produces an uneven playing 
field for businesses and generates complete uncertainty to the public. Without a 
comprehensive legal basis, fundamental rights may be left almost entirely up to 
the market’s subjective approach, a scenario that cannot provide any rule of  law 
enthusiast with plausible reassurance. Sensible legislation and effective enforcement 
are paramount, “While respondents generally downplayed the role of  compliance with legal 
rules in shaping corporate approaches to privacy, every single respondent interviewed mentioned 
two important regulatory developments they believed central to shaping the current “consumer 
expectations” approach to privacy: the behaviour of  the FTC, and the enactment of  state data 
breach notification statutes.”65
This perfunctory regard on the differences between the EU and US concepts 
doesn’t leave the European faults at bay. It is true that the current legal environment 
in Europe amasses for much of  the difficulties many businesses and even public 
entities face. Directives aren’t meant to create a single undistinguished common 
legislation but account only for the harmonization of  the EU Member States’ laws.
The new GDPR are expected to come into play precisely to overlap these 
different legal systems and produce a privacy union. Novelties such as the One Stop 
Shop66 or the Consistency Mechanism67 or the end of  prior notifications may come 
in handy for the personal data professionals, but it is essential that they don’t come 
61 For the latest available version see https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/2015_12_15-
GDPR_final_outcome_trilogue_consolidated_text.pdf. 
62 Article 35 of  the GDPR:
“1. The controller and the processor shall designate a data protection officer in any case where:
(a) the processing is carried out by a public authority or body, except for courts acting in their 
judicial capacity; or (b) the core activities of  the controller or the processor consist of  processing 
operations which, by virtue of  their nature, their scope and/or their purposes, require regular and 
systematic monitoring of  data subjects on a large scale; or (c) the core activities of  the controller or 
the processor consist of  processing on a large scale of  special categories of  data pursuant to Article 
9 and data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 9a.
63 Germany, France and Hungary are just three examples of  this. 
64 Chapter VI of  the GDPR. 
65 Ibid., page 68. 
66 Article 54 of  the GDPR. 
67 Article 57, id. 
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at the expense of  fundamental rights. Therefore we welcome the fact that Article 
17 of  the GDPR clarifies the scope of  the right to erasure (or, as referred to by the 
CJEU, the “right to be forgotten”)68 and provides for a common approach to the 
enforcement issues faced by the DPOs, although the wording of  the article seems 
to circumscribe the scope of  the right, as originally envisaged by Court.69 In the 
aftermath of  the Costeja case, the WP of  Article 29 issued its guidelines70 on the 
implementation of  the CJEU’s ruling, laying a tentative common approach to a very 
complex situation. In fact, even with such guidelines, the DPO failed to produce a 
harmonized response to complaints based on the Costeja ruling.
Therefore, the EU must apply coherent decisions when applying the law 
(Directive or GDPR), always bearing in mind Article 7 and 8 of  the Charter and 
avoiding unfavourable situations, such as the one resulting from the recent reaction 
to Google’s New Privacy Policy and what it meant for the future of  the purpose 
limitation principle.71 
One thing is for certain, the new framework for data transfer prescribed by the 
GDPR doesn’t seem to downsize the requirements to ascertain a country’s adequate 
level of  protection. In fact, it seems quite the contrary. As it stands, Article 41 
presents a series of  new conditions, namely “…the Commission shall, in particular, take 
account of  the following elements:
a) the rule of  law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, 
both general and sectorial, including concerning public security, defence, national security and criminal 
law and the access of  public authorities to personal data, as well as the implementation of  this 
legislation, data protection rules professional rules and security measures, including rules for onward 
transfer of  personal data to another third country or international organisation, which are complied 
with in that country or international organisation, jurisprudential precedents, as well as effective and 
enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects 
whose personal data are being transferred;
b) the existence and effective functioning of  one or more independent supervisory authorities in 
the third country or to which an international organisation is subject, with responsibility for ensuring 
and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules, including adequate sanctioning powers for 
assisting and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for assisting and advising the 
data subjects in exercising their rights and for co-operation with the supervisory authorities of  the 
Member States; and
68 Costeja and AEPD vs. Google Spain and Google Inc., Case C-131/12, May 2014. 
69 Para. 4 of  the Ruling: “(...)without it being necessary in order to find such a right that the inclusion 
of  the information in question in that list causes prejudice to the data subject. As the data subject 
may, in the light of  his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter, request that 
the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of  its 
inclusion in such a list of  results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest 
of  the operator of  the search engine but also the interest of  the general public in having access to 
that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would not be the 
case if  it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, 
that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of  the 
general public in having, on account of  its inclusion in the list of  results, access to the information 
in question.” 
70 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf.
71 Judith Rauhofer, “Of  Men and Mice: Should the EU Data Protection Authorities’ Reaction to 
Google’s New Privacy Policy Raise Concern for the Future of  the Purpose Limitation Principle?”, 
in European Data Protection Law Review, Vol. 1, 2015, p. 5-15. 
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c) the international commitments the third country or international organisation concerned 
has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or instruments as well 
as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection 
of  personal data.”
This only comes to support the claim that Safe Harbour 2.0 is not the way 
forward and that substantial upgrades are needed in US law, as the conditions 
aforementioned appear to be cumulative and not alternative. A simple tweak to the 
current (invalid) Decision will therefore be destined to fail, not only the CJEU’s, but 
also the new GDPR criteria for judging the adequate level of  protection.
Even if  the recent Umbrella Agreement72 makes amends for some of  the lost 
time and, notwithstanding, the importance of  the Judicial Redress Act (still to be 
passed by the US Senate), we stand by Marc Rotenberg when he posits that “The 
Judicial Redress Act73 does not provide adequate protection to permit data transfers and it does not 
address the many provisions in the Privacy Act that need to be updated.”
The application of  the Privacy Act for non-US Persons is the cornerstone of  
the EU-US Umbrella Agreement. But the current proposed changes to the Privacy 
Act will not solve the problem as the right of  judicial redress is far too attenuated. 
The much better approach would be to simply revise the definition of  “individual” to 
mean “natural person.”74
Alternatives such as Binding Corporate Rules (BCR’s) or standard contractual 
clauses that remain in place for the meantime,75 are not the solution for most of  the 
intricate problems the Schrems case highlighted concerning SH. BCRs compliance 
alone can; “…cost more than $1 million and take 18 months to fully implement, from development 
to approval, and they are limited to governing how personal data is used within a corporation…” 
Another alternative, such as model contract clauses, might require a re-examination 
of  tens of  thousands of  transfers. Model contract clauses are neither comprehensive 
nor flexible: They are largely impractical for when data is received directly from 
hundreds of  customers.76
It should be reiterated that, even if  this is currently a problem between the EU 
and the US, given the leading position both parties enjoy in what concerns personal 
data protection in the world, the reach of  this matter is far greater than the sum of  
the two protagonists. The world looks with great attention to the EU and the US, 
copying most of  the solutions put forward by the two front-runners.
Personal data is a global subject and will rapidly need a global solution. The 
recent appointment by the UN of  the Special Rapporteur for Privacy is a clear signal 
of  the continuous worldwide concern with privacy. Initiatives such as UN’s Global 
Pulse, focused on the adequate use of  Big Data in Humanitarian contexts shed 
72 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/dp-umbrella-agreement_en.pdf. 
73 Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1428/text.
74 Page 15 of  his written statement, cited in note 41.
75 The Statement of  The Article 29 Working Party of  16 October 2015 defers to the end of  January 
2016 a final common stance on what actions to take in the future given the ECJ’s ruling, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-release/art29_press_
material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf. 
76 As claimed in his written statement presented to the joint hearing of  the Subcommittee 
on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade with the Subcommittee on Communications and 
Technology, Committee on Energy and Commerce, gathered to “Examin[e] the Eu Safe Harbor 
Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows” by John Murphy Senior Vice President for 
International Policy U.S. Chamber of  Commerce, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF16/20151103/104148/HHRG-114-IF16-Wstate-MurphyJ-20151103.pdf. 
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light to the path of  privacy in the international community and deserve a common, 
sensible but rigorous approach by the UN Member States.
5. Conclusion
The SH Decision is no more and the current negotiations between the EU 
and the US, although respectable, come at a very late stage and are bound to be 
hindered by the practical reality of  living. As always, it is our opinion that the 
political environment continues to heavily influence will influence the outcome 
of  the meetings. Furthermore, the ever growing terrorism threat, which remains 
a prominent issue in geo-political discourse, will most likely further protract the 
process of  creating a major breakthrough on the legal aspects of  the negotiation.
As it stands, the current legal framework for the transfer of  data across the 
Atlantic is hanging by a thread while the EC, the Member States and its citizens and 
the companies, inter alia, await for the final decision from Article 29 WP regarding the 
remaining alternative mechanisms (e.g. BCR’s). The ruling was very clear on what can 
or cannot be considered as a compliant with the principle of  adequate protection in 
any third country, making a case for the “portability” of  fundamental rights of  EU 
citizens across the world. More than a direct attack to cultural relativism, the ruling 
of  the Court provides the grounds for DPOs to act whenever necessary, reinforcing 
the independence that all supervisory bodies need to be vested with. After Schrems, 
one would not have to be incredibly adventurous in order to pass a preliminary 
judgment on the conformity of  those mechanisms with the CJEU ruling. In reality, 
it’s not a question of  how these alternative means can assure an adequate level of  
protection in the US as much as it is a question of  whether or not the US will 
implement significant changes to its own legal framework in order to respond to a 
foreign judicial decision. If  we rely solely on the history of  EU-US relations, than 
the chances of  formulating a workable solution to this issue are dire to say the least. 
However, the fundamental issue at stake does not end on US soil. The adequate 
protection principle transcends EU-US relations and applies to relevant jurisdictions 
in the world. For so long as a global solution to this contentious issue remains elusive, 
personal data transfers will continue to be embroiled in a wave of  uncertainty and 
controversy.
Although unforeseeable in the near future, this will, likely, become the only 
way to guarantee that the rising global demand for data transfer occurs in a safe and 
legally binding environment where judicial redress is assured, credible oversight is 
instituted, enforcement actions are provided in due time and essential data protection 
principles are abided by.
In the meantime, personal data transfers will have to rely on short-term palliative 
solutions, such as bilateral commitments of  uncertain legal credibility that are, 
constantly endangered by judicial disputes or technical time-consuming and costly 
undertakings of  immense magnitude, such as moving all data servers collecting and 
processing EU citizens’ personal data into EU territory.
Paraphrasing Robert A. Heinlein in the opening remarks of  “And he built a 
crooked house,”77 as he was referring to Hollywood, “It’s [Data Transfer]. It’s not our fault 
– we didn’t ask for it, [Data Transfer] just grew.”
77 Robert Heinlein, op. cit. 9-61.
